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EQUAL PROTECTION, CLASS LEGISLATION,
AND SEX DISCRIMINATION: ONE SMALL
CHEER FOR MR. HERBERT
SPENCER'S SOCIAL STATICSt
Mark G. Yudof*
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE. By William E. Nelson. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press. 1988. Pp. ix, 253. $25.
Freedom being the prerequisite to normal life in the individual, equal
freedom becomes the prerequisite to normal life in society.
- Herbert Spencer, Social Statics 1

Eclecticism in law and philosophy is rarely in fashion, 2 for instinctively many scholars strive for the systematic and universal, the
woµld-be-conquerors of the diversity of history and ideologies and cultural particularism. And the hedgehogs, to borrow from Isaiah Berlin, 3 frequently command great respect from the foxes. It seems
admirable that the hedgehogs seek to abstract the universal from the
diverse and mundane, to perceive an interconnectedness amid the apparent disarray and chaos. But the pursuit of Occam's razor also may
distract a scholar and distort reality. As Grant Gilmore warned in
The Ages ofAmerican Law, "the lesson of the past two hundred years
is that we will do well to be on our guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems."4
Profes~or William E. Nelson 5 may be counted among the foxes. In
his excellent book The Fourteenth Amendment, he declines to succumb to the temptation of conceptual unity for its own sake, for he
prefers the messiness of historical accuracy. Professor Nelson's pri-
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Dean and James A. Elkins Centennial Chair in Law, School of J.,aw, The University of
Texas at Austin. B.A. 1965, LL.B. 1968, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. I wish to express
my appreciation to Douglas Laycock, Sanford Levinson, and Scot Powe for their many sugges·
tions and criticisms.
1. H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 106 (1865).
2. But see M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
4-6 (1983); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103
(1983).
3. I. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox (1953).
4. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977).
5. Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1962, Hamilton College; LL.B. 1965, New
York University; Ph.D. 1971, Harvard University.

1366

May 1990)

Equal Protection

1367

mary insight is that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment represents a complex, multifaceted concept, drawing on a
number of distinct historical and intellectual traditions. The urge to
identify a single animating philosophy or an overarching theory of
equal protection is understandable but misguided. 6 And for Nelson it
is not just a question of multiple meanings of the text (p. 61) - the
interpretative philosophy or hermeneutics, as the cognoscente would
urge. 7 The framers of the Civil War amendments were eclectics in the
best sense, drawing, perhaps naively and inconsistently, on natural
rights, 8 Jacksonian democratic principles, 9 abolitionism, 10 state constitutional provisions, federalism, and other intellectual currents of the
time. 11 As Professor Nelson notes, "Whatever the reality, a popular
ideology of liberty and equality existed in antebellum America, This
mid-nineteenth-century ideology, from which section one of the fourteenth amendment was ultimately derived, had an amorphous quality
that imprecisely linked together several ideas, each with a different
core content" (p. 13; footnote omitted).
The urge to stand on the shoulders of the framers or framing generation is virtually irresistible. 12 But the unhappy truth - at least for
those who seek definitive guidance from the past - is that the nineteenth-century mind was no more orderly, precise, consistent, or clear
than the twentieth-century mind. 13 As Professor Nelson puts the
point, with some irony, "it was the very emptiness and vagueness of
the concept [of equality] that made it so useful and popular. Equality
could mean almost anything ..." (p. 21).
For better or worse, the equal protection clause represents a reservoir of concepts. 14 This does not mean that the clause is infinitely
elastic or that any level of judicial activism or restraint is excused. 15
Nor does it sugge$t that the modem anachronists are necessarily vindicated, as they perceive twentieth-century ideology in the prescient
6. See generally Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979).
7. See generally INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (S.
Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. 1988); Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1
(1984).
8. See, e.g., J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 21 (1965); Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235 (1984); Soifer, supra
note 6, at 659-65.
9. See generally E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN (1970).
10. Id.
11. See generally H. HYMAN & w. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAw (1982); Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
12. See R. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1980).
13. See generally Farber & Muench, supra note 8, at 241-46.
14. See H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968).
15. See Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court 1873-1903, 29 BUFFALO L.
REV. 667 (1980).
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minds of the nineteenth century. But it does suggest some care in disentangling the various threads of the idea of equality embodied in the
fourteenth amendment, some recognition that conflicts among competing concepts may be inevitable, and some humility in asserting that
one vision dictates its meaning. Justice Stevens' assertions notwithstanding, 16 perhaps there is more than one equal protection clause.
I

Uncharitable though it may be to say so, the antislavery Republicans who framed the equal protection clause "were not original thinkers," and they thought of themselves as "guardians of the original
American tradition, not as inventors of a novel ideology." 17 One
source of that tradition was the Enlightenment and the naturalistic
theories that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and
informed the Declaration of Independence. 18 The concept of a higher
law, Nelson suggests, embraced the claim "that God or nature required that people and their governments behave in particular ways"
(p. 23). Another aspect of the American tradition asserted that citizens had inherent rights that derived from the nature and form of a
republican political and social system (p. 24). These arguments were
often "a form of political rhetoric occasionally addressed to courts but
more frequently addressed to legislative bodies or to the people themselves" (p. 23).
The 1860 Republican platform specifically reaffirmed the natural
law elements of the Declaration oflndependence. 19 In this view, people are equal in the sense of having an equal right to the state's protection of their natural freedoms. 20 Blacks possess such natural rights,
and they are entitled to the full or equal protection of the law in asserting them. 21 In that sense, the equal protection clause is a corrective
measure that seeks not to create new rights but to guarantee the protection of already existent rights of African-Americans that were being
disregarded by state governments. 22 The most obvious manifestation
16. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
17. Farber & Muench, supra note 8, at 241.
18. Id. (citing J. LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 5 (J. Gough ed.
1946)).
19. Id. at 249. See generally E. FONER, supra note 9, at 75-76, 290.
20. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 8, at 21. See generally N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHTS
AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 60-83 (1982).
21. See E. FONER, supra note 9, at 290-95; Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the
Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499 (1985); Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment
Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 305 (1988).
22. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REsr
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 466 (3d ed. 1874);
see also Farber & Muench, supra note 8, at 269; Soifer, supra note 6, at 701.
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of natural law theory is the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 23 providing that
blacks have the same rights as whites to enter into contracts, to own
property, to sue, and to testify- in other words to invoke the protections of the legal system with regard to their civil or natural rights. 24
This concept of the full protection of natural rights admits of a
pluralistic vision of justice akin to Michael Walzer's theory of
"spheres of justice."25 Equality in one sphere may co-exist with inequality in another. For example, Lincoln believed in constitutional
equality of civil and personal rights for African-Americans but he was
opposed to the extension of suffrage to them. Economic equality
would follow only if blacks took advantage of their legal rights to improve their conditions {pp. 19-20). Other proponents of equality believed that inequality of wealth and social and political rights might
co-exist with equality of civil or natural rights {p. 19). Their naive
assumption was that the spheres can be separated, that inequalities in
one domain will not spill over into another.
The other natural law vision of equal protection drew on the social
contract theories of seventeenth-century philosophers like Locke and
Stair. Political authority can be justified and there is a duty to obey
the law only if there is a contract among the members of a community
- with no member having superiority over any other member. 26 People are equal in the sense of each person's voluntary consent counting
equally, though they may not be equal in talents, virtue, status, or
wealth. This theory is consistent with Kant's insistence on a morality
premised on respect for persons and treating each individual as a kingdom of ends, but it primarily reflects the idea that the legitimate exercise of power is predicated on the consent of the governed. Equality of
this sort defines the concept of citizenship.27 From this perspective,
the fourteenth amendment can be viewed as repudiating the Dred Scott
decision28 and its impoverished view of black citizenship.29
Whatever the natural law background of the fourteenth amendment, there is universal recognition that a fundamental purpose of the
framers was to address racial discrimination in the post-Civil War
period:
The Republican proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment all agreed
that race was not a legitimate reason to treat people differently in respect
to their civil rights - that a black !Dan and a white man, even though
23. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
24. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 169-70 (1977); Soifer, supra note 6, at 705.
25. M. WALZER, supra note 2.
26. See generally N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 20.
27. See Slaughter-House.Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95-98 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
28. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
29. See generally E. FoNER, supra note 9, at 261-300.
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they occupied a different socio-economic position, must receive the same
treatment from the law. [p. 89]

The equal protection clause thus embraces a specific conception of racial justice - one that may permit protective measures in the transition from slavery to freedom 30 even as it aspires to a more global
concept of constitutional equality. And in the modern context, extensions of equal protection doctrine to other groups increasingly have
depended on extrapolating from the circumstances of AfricanAmericans. 31
But nineteenth-century Americans, like their eighteenth-century
counterparts, were not content to protect liberty only through the provision of rights. In Madisonian fashion, they believed that liberty requires the proper governmental structure. However ironic it may
appear more than one hundred years later, the framers of the fourteenth amendment also were concerned with "federalism as a bulwark
of liberty" (p. 27). Opponents of the amendment routinely invoked
the specter of domination by the federal government and the diminution of state power (p. 111). Far from accepting such criticism, the
proponents bridled and went to great lengths to rebut the argument.
They argued that the Southern states would quickly comply with the
amendment, thereby obviating the potential conflict with the national
government (p. 111), that Congress would be the primary enforcer of
the amendment and would respect states' rights (p. 112), and that
"[t]he only effect of the amendment was to prevent the states from
discriminating arbitrarily between different classes of citizens" (p.
115). The last argument is the most interesting, for it undercuts natural law theories. It is predicated on the assumption that the fourteenth
amendment did not create new rights, but only addressed the unequal
treatment of classes of persons with respect to those rights that the
states chose to recognize.
To perceive the importance of any one of these three strands of
equal protection - and I will soon add a fourth - is not to deny the
importance or relevance of the other strands. That is the essence of
Nelson's careful approach to constitutional history. But the modern
interpreter of the equal protection clause should be wary, for the multiple historical roots of the fourteenth amendment breed complexity
and confusion. This is particularly true, as Professor Nelson points
out, because the framers did not view themselves as involved in the
task of delineating a logical and coherent set of legal doctrines for application in concrete cases:
Those who used the discourse of equality, natural law, natural rights,
and federalism in the three decades before the Civil War generally were
30. See Soifer, supra note 6.
31. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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not concerned with intellectual coherence or precision, but with persuading those to whom their rhetoric was addressed ....
Ultimately, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would require the transformation of this political rhetoric . . . into legal doctrine. . . . But the congressmen and state legislators who had been
schooled in the imprecise modes of antebellum thought did not transform their discourse overnight. They continued to make fuzzy use of the
old antebellum ideas, in part, perhaps, because the old imprecision had
the same value to them during Reconstruction that it had before the
Civil War: it enabled them to retain the support of political coalitions
whose individual members shared an agreement only about vague ideas,
not about specific programs. [pp. 36, 38-39; citation omitted]

In this light, it is a mistake to assess the fourteenth ·amendment as if it
were a conventional example of lawmaking. Rather, as Professor Neison suggests, it is far more accurate to understand the fourteenth
amendment as a "peace treaty to be administered by Congress," a
treaty that embodied conflicting and ambiguous antebellum "hopes for
a just society" (pp. 110-11).
II

While there are many :flowers (and perhaps a few weeds) in the
equal protection garden, some :flowers have received more appreciative
gazes than others. In large measure, I attribute the neglect to a simple
misperception: too many modern constitutionalists ignore the history
of the Jacksonian concept of equal protection before it was transformed by the abolitionists and embodied in the fourteenth amendment. To correct this misperception, I wish to explore at length
another facet of equal protection, a facet that thus far I have deliberately overlooked in Professor Nelson's splendid taxonomy. I then will
apply the antebellum concept of equal protection, as refined in the
fourteenth amendment, to the question of sex discrimination.
The fertile ground for our inquiry is deceptively simple and derived
from Jacksonian and antislavery principles (pp. 13-21): the fourteenth
amendment should guarantee equality under the law. 32 As Representative John Bingham eloquently stated the idea, the equal protection
clause declares "the absolute equality of all citizens of the United
States politically and civilly before their own laws;' (p. 78):
Your Constitution provides that no man, no matter what his color, no
matter beneath what sky he may have been born, no matter in what
disastrous conflict or by what tyrannical hand his liberty may have been
cloven down, no matter how poor, no matter how friendless, no matter
how ignorant, shall be deprived of life or liberty or property without due
process oflaw - law in its highest sense, that law which is the perfection
32. See N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 20. See generally F. HAYEK, THE CONSI1TUTION OF
LIBERTY (1960); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
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of human reason, and which is impartial, equal, exact justice. [p. 78;
footnote omitted]

To state the principle more generally, the nineteenth-century notion of
equality before the law was one of a normative order "which impartially and universally regulates the actions and relationships of legal
persons" through general and abstract laws. 33
Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of equality under
law, two preliminary observations are in order. First, the federal equal
protection clause drew on earlier state constitutional provisions seeking similar objectives. The eminent nineteenth-century treatise writer
Thomas Cooley said as much, urging that "it was not within the
power of the States before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,
to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws .... " 34 It was
only the unwillingness of many states to afford equal protection to
freed blacks that occasioned the immediate need for the amendment
(p. 79).
Second, the confusion surrounding the equal protection clause
stems in part from a misunderstanding of the normative roots of
equality under law. 35 Such equality is not only a principle of formal
justice; it also draws on a distinctly nineteenth-century concept of liberty. 36 Equal protection affirms the autonomy and liberty of persons
to order their own affairs, subject to general laws which do not create
favored or disfavored classes of citizens. 37 Equality refers to equality
of freedom and not to equality in the sense of achieving distributive
justice.
To comprehend this meaning of equal protection, one should begin
with the language of the Constitution itself. The fourteenth amendment declares that a state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law" or "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 38 Equal protection of the laws is afforded to "any person," not just to blacks. 39
While the equal protection clause was certainly designed to eliminate
some or all forms of racial discrimination, 40 it creates protections for
33. N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 20, at 7.
34. See T. CoOLEY, supra note 22, at 466.
35. See generally H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND·
MENT (1977); Farber & Muench, supra note 8; Kay, supra note 15.
36. See F. HAYEK supra note 32; H. SPENCER, supra note 1.
37. See F. HAYEK supra note 32, at 154.
38. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
39. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 14; Laycock, Book Review, 59 TEXAS L. REV.
343 (1981) (reviewing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)).

40. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 8; Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist
Grounds, SO MICH. L. REv. 462 (1982); Soifer, supra note 6. See generally H. BELZ, A NEW
BIRTH OF FREEDOM (1976); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection
of the Laws'~ 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421.
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all. 41 Indeed, even pre-Civil War abolitionists understood the need for
a more expansive approach to equality under law:
What ... began as a campaign for protection of slaves and free Negroes
presently became one to guarantee civil liberties more generally. Obliged
to defend even their rights to discuss slavery and to seek its overthrow by
constitutional means, abolitionists focused intently on the problem of securing and enforcing constitutional rights. They were interested, not
merely in their own rights, but also in those of other dissident and unpopular groups including Indians and Mormons.42
But if equal protection means something more than a substantive pro-

hibition on racial discrimination, what exactly does it mean?
Consider the claim of Thomas Cooley, perhaps the most influential
constitutional writer of the nineteenth century, that the principle of
equal protection was embodied in the Constitution even before the
fourteenth amendment was adopted:
It was not within the power of the States before the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the
laws; but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when these
were made freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to citizenship, and some State laws were in force which established discriminations against them. To settle doubts and preclude such laws, the
fourteenth amendment was adopted; and the same securities which one
citizen may demand, all others are entitled to. 43

Cooley's analysis, put forward only a few years after the ratification of
the fourteenth amendi;nent, asserts that the amendment only clarified
the application of an older principle of law to the newly emancipated
slaves. Howard Graham, in his massive analysis of the history of the
fourteenth amendment, agreed with Cooley's assessment nearly a hundred years later:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, like the Bill of Rights which the Fathers
added to the original Constitution-in 1791, was regarded by its framers
and ratifiers as declaratory of the previously existing law and
Constitution.
. . . [S]ection 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] blanketed the freedmen in; it couldn't and didn't throw others out. Application of these
guarantees in defense of Negro and racial rights, in other words, was
climatic, normative, additive, not original, unique, or exclusionary. Negroes were to get what others long ago had had. That was the whole
41. See H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 169; H. TAYLOR, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 48 (1917); Laycock, supra note 39.
42. H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 169 (footnote omitted).
43. T. CoOLEY, supra note 22, at 466; see also H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 299-300, 32223. John A. Bingham, the Ohio Congressman who later was the primary draftsman of§§ 1 and
5 of the fourteenth amendment, made much the same point in 1859. H. GRAHAM, supra note 14,
at 283-84. See generally P. PALUDAN, A CoVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CoNSTITUTION,
LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1975).
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thought and point ....44

Thus, as Professor Nelson well understands, equal protection
speaks not only to race but also to an underlying constitutional principle of nondiscrimination by class that includes the prohibition of racial
discrimination (p. 133). It is broader than the narrow principle that
the fourteenth amendment prohibits state-sponsored racism, deriving
protection for other groups only by analogy (p. 180). These nonracial
origins of the unequal treatment of classes under the equal protection
clause, too often, have been ignored by twentieth-century courts and
scholars, particularly as they rush to limit judicial review in cases arising in the economic sphere.45

III
The bedrock principle underlying the quest for equality under law
is disarmingly simple: "every one has a right to demand that he be
governed by general rules." 46 No class of persons is to be privileged.
There are to be no castes of untouchables. That principle can be
traced to varied sources, including the British political philosophers
upon whose ideas the American Declaration of Independence is
largely foun,ded. Nineteenth-century court opinions make frequent
reference to John Locke's maxim that' those who legislate "are to govern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court
and the countryman at plough"; 47 Blackstone, Rousseau, even Cicero
are relied upon for similar sentiments. 48 The idea,of "equality before
the law," advanced by Charles Sumner in 1849, looked back to the
French revolutionary constitution of 1791: "Men are born and continue free and equal in their rights."49 And English common law and
statutes were hostile to domestic monopolies, monopolies that restricted the liberties of some merchants but not others. so
But the sources of this idea of equality are also found on this side
of the Atlantic. The Declaration of Independence comes immediately
to mind. So also do the provisions of the Constitution that bar granting title~ of nobility, impairing contractual obligations, or enacting
44. H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 299-300, 581 (emphasis added; footnote omitted); see also
Farber & Muench, supra note 8.
45. P. 20Q. See generally Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation, 3 LAW &
HISr. R.Ev. 293 (1985).
46. T. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 459.
47. Id. (quoting J. LoCKE, LoCKE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 142 p. 459); see e.g., State v.
Duffy, 7 N~v. 342, 349 (1872).
48. See Frank & Munro, supra note 40, at 436.
49. Id. (quoting c. SUMNER, 10 WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 282, 327 (1874)).
50. See, e.g., Darcey v. Allin, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602); Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng.
Rep. 769 (K.B. 1599). See generally Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 792-97 (1982).
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laws that apply after the fact or single out particular individuals for
government attention - aii of which go to confirm the belief that "all
are equals in government." 51 For that reason, law must be general,
and not particularized; future-looking, not retrospective. Five of the
original thirteen states recommended that the proposed Bill of Rights
forbid Congress from granting "exclusive advantages of commerce" to
particular merchants or companies. 52 Many nineteenth-century state
constitutions insisted that legislatures proceed by general rather than
special laws. 53 Even in states whose constitutions did not specifically
ban special legislatio~, courts relied on provisions such as "law-of-theland" clauses to require general laws, "equally binding upon every
member of the community."54
This concern with general laws, according to Professor F.A.
Hayek, was the chief constitutional development of pre-Civil War
America:
We find in discussions of the period constant references to the conception of "general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of
no resentment, and without knowing upon whom they will operate."
There was much discussion of the undesirability of "special" as distinguished from "general" acts. Judicial decisions repeatedly stressed that
laws proper ought to be "general public laws equally binding upon every
member of the community under similar circumstances." Various attempts were made to embody this distinction in state constitutions, until
it came to be regarded as one of the chief limitations upon legislation. 55
51. See J. ELY, supra note 31, at 90-91; F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 188; Corwin, The Basic
Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247, 248-55 (1914).
52. Conant, supra note 50, at 800-01.
53. See T. CooLEY, supra note 22, at 456-66.
54. Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 470 (1871); cf. Bailey v. Illinois, 190 Ill. is, 60 N.E. 98
(1901).
55. F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 188 (footnote omitted). State supreme courts were generally
not reluctant, except in volatile cases involving the treatment of blacks or other racial minorities,
to overturn special legislation as in violation of state constitutions. For example, as early as
1814, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in refusing to uphold the suspension of a
general law in favor of an individual, stated:
It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the
spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that any one should be
subjected to losses, damages, suits or actions, from which all others under like circumstances
are exempted.
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 404 (1814) (citations omitted). Similarly, Chancellor Kent, writing in 1816, opined that a law limited to public officials was unconstitutional since it was "not
impartial in the imposition which it creates. If the principle be just, it ought to have a general
and equal application." w. KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETfERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D. 163 (1898).
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1860 stated that the legislature "cannot, under color of
making laws to regulate and extend the boundaries of cities or villages, enact for the mere purpose of cutting off or reducing the exemptions of particular individuals, and thus legislate specially for it against certain persons, contrary to the spirit and intent of the constitution." Bull v.
Conroe, 13 Wis. 260, 272-73 (1860). Judge Cooley cites numerous state court decisions to the
same effect and synthesizes them into the following general rule:
[A] statute would not be constitutional which should proscribe a class or a party for opin-
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More recently, Professor Robert Gordon, writing from a political perspective very different from that of Hayek, concurred in his appraisal
of nineteenth-century constitutional law: "[F]reedom and jural equality, regardless of status, are made to depend on the abstract, formally
realizable, nondiscretionary, and above all general nature of legal
principles. " 56
The idea that laws should be general and not tainted by considerations of class or caste was widely recognized and accepted before the
fourteenth amendment was enacted (pp. 13-21). It was part-and-parcel of the presumed fairness of governmental processes, 57 of due process of law. When Cooley argued that the states were not free to deny
the equal protection of the laws even before the adoption of the Civil
War amendments, he was generally drawing on due process notions.
He presumably meant that state due process, equal protection, special
legislation, and other constitutional clauses had implicitly or explicitly
forbidden "special" or "class" legislation, and his treatise devoted
most of its section on impartial legislation to developments in the
states prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. 58 He made
only fleeting references to the newly enacted equal protection clause.
President Jackson, in his veto message on the second national
bank, also had stressed that the law should not add "artificial distinctions" by seeking "to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges,
to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful." 59 He first
advanced the phrase "equal protection" in 1832, almost forty years
before it was written into the Constitution:
ion's sake, or which should select particular individuals from a class or locality, and subject
them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them special obligations or burdens, from which
others in the same locality or class are exempt.
T. CooLEY, supra note 22, at 457-58.
56. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age ofAmerican Enterprise, 1870-1920,
in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1730-1940, at 90 (G. Geison ed.
1983).
57. The notion of fair procedures included the requirement that the law be the same for all,
that it subject different persons to the same rules for vindicating entitlements and resolving disputes. See Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464 (1871). As Cooley quotes an 1825 Maine Supreme
Court decision:
On principle it can never be within the bounds of legitimate legislation to enact a special
law, or pass a resolve dispensing with the general law in a particular case, and granting a
privilege and indulgence to one man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of
such general law, leaving all other persons under its operation. Such a law is neither just nor
reasonable in its consequences. It is our boast that we live under a government of laws, and
not of men; but this can hardly be deemed a blessing, unless those laws have for their immovable basis the great principles of constitutional equality.
T. CooLEY, supra note 22, at 459 n.2 (quoting Lewis v. Webb., 3 Me. 326, 336 (1825)). Or, as
Daniel Webster urged in his famous argument in the Dartmouth College Case, a legislative enactment must be a general law ifit is "to be considered the law of the land." Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
58. T. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 456-66.
59. J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (1978) (quoting
Jackson).
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There are no necessary evils in Government. Its evils exist only in its
abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does
it showers its favor alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor,
it would be an unqualified blessing. 60

This substantive view of equal protection was rooted, in part, in a
due process conception of the separation of legislative and judicial
powers. Due process required that legislative bodies enact general
laws, that they legislate for all citizens. 61 Legislatures were not to enact laws that benefited or harmed particular classes and individuals in
a predictable manner. 62 Conversely, "judicial and quasi-judicial officers regularly and legitimately make decisions about individuals." 63
Due process, then, meant different things for different branches of government. Legislatures are not required to give notice of pending legislation to affected parties, nor must they listen to such parties. But
legislatures must enact general laws, laws that do not create classes of
disfavored citizens (p. 180). Judicial bodies were to provide each person with the process that was due in applying abstract laws to specific
persons. Here due process did require notice and a meaningful opportunity for the individual to be heard. 64 In this sense, the equal protection clause did little more than affirm a structural vision of due
process, 65 an affirmation necessitated by the mistreatment of AfricanAmericans by state governments.
The difficulty of elaborating this principle of equal protection resides in defining what one means by a general law and then applying
that definition to concrete cases. The framers of the fourteenth
amendment faced two critical issues that continue to plague fourteenth
amendment analysis to this day:
The first one, once they moved beyond obviously defective racial criteria,
was to distinguish classifications that would be reasonable under the
amendment from those that would be arbitrary. The second one was
whether legislation which classified people on both reasonable and arbitrary grounds should be declared unconstitutional. [p. 138]

But, while they discussed equality under the law at length, the framers
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. See Laycock, supra note 39, at 372.
62. F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 210. Justice Stevens has made a similar point:
All general laws - whether designed to protect the health of the community, to control
urban traffic, to improve the environment, or to raise tax revenues - curtail the individual's
freedom to do as he pleases.•.. Ordinarily the mere fact that the existence of a general
regnlation may significantly impair individual liberty raises no question under the Due Process Clause. But the Clause is implicated when the State singles out one person for adverse
treatment significantly different from that imposed on the community at large.
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 484-85 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See
generally Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13
CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 496-98 (1979).
63. Laycock, supra note 39, at 372.
~·Id.

65. Cf. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.

REv.

561 (1983).
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rarely attempted to connect general principles to concrete applications
(p. 144).
When the framers did attempt to explain the meaning of equality
under the equal protection clause, their explanations often were not
particularly enlightening. For example, Professor Nelson quotes from
a congressional speech by Senator Richard Yates in which Yates attempted to illuminate the distinction:
To define the length of residence necessary to enable a man to vote, to
say what his age shall be, is one thing; and to say that he shall not vote at
all because he is black or white, is an entirely different thing. In the
latter case, color is made the disqualification, just as race would be if
Germans were excluded from the ballot-box. The State may preserve a
right; it may fix the qualifications; it may impose certain restrictions so
as to have that right preserved in the best form to the people; but it is not
legitimately in the power of the State, it is not in the power of the Congress of the United States, it is not in any earthly power to destroy a
man's equal rights to his property, to his franchise, to his suffrage, or to
the right to aspire to office - I mean according to the true theory of a
republican government. [p. 83; citation omitted]

But while Senator Yates gives an example of class legislation, beyond
all "earthly power," and of a reasonable classification (though the
modern Supreme Court disagrees), 66 he gives not a hint as to what is
the conceptual basis of the distinction. Ultracrepidarian rhetoric simply substitutes itself for theoretical clarity.
The framers' inability to articulate a theory of class legislation may
be explained by the inherent difficulty of the problem; philosophers
have debated the meaning of equality for many centuries. But Professor Nelson argues that the absence of a coherent theory of equality is
not just an accident or a function of the intractability of the intellectual puzzle; rather, it is also a testament to the political realities of the
time:
[M]ost of the rhetoric of equality preached by the Republican supporters
of the Fourteenth Amendment never went beyond vague generalities.•..
Republicans agreed that all people, including blacks, were entitled to
equal rights. However, an element of the agreement - an element essential to creating the supermajorities need to incorporate the equal protection concept into the Fourteen Amendment - was its ultimate
emptiness. Americans of 1866, like Americans of today, could agree
upon the rightfulness of equality only because they did not agree on its
meaning, and their political leaders, unlike the managers of the modem
bureaucratic state, were content to enact the general principle rather
than its specific applications into law. [p. 80; footnote omitted]

Thus the critical questions of equal protection analysis - which classi66. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one-year residency requirement for
voting declared unconstitutional).
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fl.cations of persons run afoul of equal protection and why do they do
so - were rarely answered by the framers.
To discern the meaning of equality under the fourteenth amendment, one must begin with a recognition that slavery and race were the
driving forces of conceptual disharmony during the first half of the
nineteenth century. 67 President Jackson's vision of equal protection
extended only to social and economic barriers and was influenced by
the traditional abhorrence of state-created monopolies; 68 its application to blacks "would have astounded Jackson, who would assuredly
have disapproved." 69 But sometimes powerful ideas drift across ideological barriers;70 they become serviceable in the aid of new causes,
though the transition may cause confusion. Such a drift occurred in
nineteenth-century America. Professor Eric Foner ably describes this
phenomenon as many Jacksonian Democrats moved from a focus on
"banks, monopolies, and paper money" ("Money Power") to a focus
on slavery and the South ("Slave Power"). 71 Consider Foner's portrayal of Senator Thomas Morris, a leading anti-slavery Jacksonian
Democrat:
In 1838 and 1839, Morris ... astounded the Senate and electrified ~ti
slavery northerners by declaring that a new power, based on slavery, was
threatening the liberties of the nation.... He [later] pledged to devote
his energies to the cause of emancipation, "and against the power of
these two great interests - the slave power of the South, and banking
power of the North - which are now uniting to rule this country." ...
[H]e warned that, ju~t as with the Bank, the people would mobilize
against the Slave Power - "this goliath of all monopolies."
... [It] the Money Power was the "master symbol" for the Age of
Jackson, the Slave Power was equally effective as a symbol for all the
fears and hostilities harbored by northerners toward slavery and the
South. Morris and countless Jacksonians who later joined the Republican party showed how easily one could jump from one master symbol to
the next. The fight against the Bank ... represented for the Jacksonians
"equality against privilege, liberty against domination, honest work
against dead precedent." 72

The transformation from Jacksonian equal protection to antislavery equal protection produced enormous strain in the political and
legal systems. Many state constitutions and statutes continued to discriminate against free blacks in the 1800-1860 petiod,73 and courts
67.
68.
69.
70.

See generally M. TuSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860 (1981).
See generally Conant, supra note 50.
J. POLE, supra note 59, at 146.
See Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amend-

ment, 1990 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
71. E. FONER, supra note 9, at 90.
72. Id. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
73. See H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 162.
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often responded with disingenuousness or silence. For example, Chief
Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Alger 14
fully endorsed the distinction between "class legislation and legislation
enacted for the purpose of benefiting the polity as a whole" (p. 176).
As Professor Nelson writes:
At issue in Alger was whether the state could limit the length to which
docks extended into Boston harbor in order to insure the free passage of
vessels in shipping channels. The court held that "all real estate . . . is
subject to some restraint for the general good" and that the legislature
had "power, by general law affecting all . . . equally and alike, to make
reasonable regulations, declaring the public right." ... Laws that benefited and affected all equally were to be distinguished, in tum, from class
legislation - laws that, in common nineteenth century jargon, took
property or rights away from A merely for the purpose of giving the
same property or rights to B. Such class legislation was, of course, arbitrary and unreasonable. [pp. 176-77; footnotes omitted]

Yet, writing two years earlier, Shaw had concluded that separate
schools for black and white students did not violate that principle. 75
The important point about this period, despite many setbacks in
the courts, is that the abolitionists and radical Republicans of that era
were drawing on an existing concept of equal protection when they
argued for eradicating slavery and protecting the rights of AfricanAmericans. 76 When the phrase "equal protection" worked its way
into the platforms and candidates' speeches of the Liberty, Free Soil,
and Republican parties in the 1840-1860 period, 77 they were not inventing a concept to deal with the exigency of slavery; rather, they
were reexamining an older concept, reshaping it in the service of their
cause.'\
As the concept of equal protection or equality under the law
evolved, analytic problems also surfaced in nonracial cases. As the
nineteenth century progressed, legislative supremacy in the states declined. Scandals tarnished many legislatures, and, in the Jacksonian
era, voters began to fear landlords, creditors, and the wealthy - those
who were thought to be too powerful in legislative processes. Restrictions on legislative power became more frequent, and often took the
form of bans on local or special legislation. 78 The most frequent in74. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
75. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849); see also Van Camp v.
Board of Educ. of Logan, 9 Ohio St. 326 (1859). See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at
172-85; L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957); J.
PoLE, supra note 59, at 146-47; Baltimore & Williams, The State Constitutional Roots of the
''Separate But Equal" Doctrine: Roberts v. City of Boston, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 537 (1986).
76. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 14; Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the
Antebellum Era, 32 AMER. J. LEGAL H1sr. 305 (1988).
77. See H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 301.
78. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 107-08, 305 (1973); Benedict, supra
note 45.
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stances of unconstitutional special laws were those suspending a statute of limitations, granting rights of appeal, and authorizing divorces
in particular instances when such rights were not generally available.79
Yet how were these laws different from special provisions for common
carriers and bankers, and statutes granting corporate franchises to
named persons, all of which were widely upheld? 80
The conceptual disunity of equal protection in the antebellum period demonstrates a profound point about the idea of equality. Equality has no meaning without some prior conception of substantive
rights, for we must determine how people are alike before we can apply equal protection standards. 81 Yet the determination of likeness
veils a substantive determination of rights, since equality will flow inextricably from such prior and "anterior constitutional standards." 82
If persons are to be treated with equal respect, then one must ascertain
first those traits that entitle one to equal respect - and those traits
will stem from a substantive concept of rights. 83
There is no easy way out of this quandary. The equal protection
clause in conjunction with the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment is a substantive provision designed to secure
liberty for all, not just racial minorities or other special groups. 84 This
objective was to be achieved through the concept of equality under
law, connecting the antebellum insistence on general and abstract laws
with the post-Civil War federal guarantee of equal protection. But the
historical antipathy to class legislation and the distaste for special laws
did not reflect a more general hostility toward classifications in law,
for distinctions among groups for purposes of taxation, expending
79. T. CoOLEY, supra note 22, at 4S8-S9. Some lawyers even argued that all ·~udge-made
law is special legislation" because of its ad hoc nature, and that "[a]ll American law must be a
statute law." R. Rantoul, Oration at the Scituate (July 4, 1836), reprinted in THE LEGAL MIND
IN AMERICA 222-27 (P. Miller ed. 1962).
80. T. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 4S7, 460-62; see also State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 3S3 (1872)
(concurring opinion); H. TAYLOR, supra note 41, at 829. The rationality standard for reviewing
such classifications is not very helpful. See Linde, Due Process ofLawmaking, SS NEB. L. REv.
197 (1976). Hayek is exactly right when he says that to argue "that the law must not make
irrelevant distinctions or that it must discriminate between persons for reasons which have no
connection with the purpose of the law is little more than evading the issue." F. HAYEK, supra
note 32, at 209 (footnote omitted); see also Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1049 (1979); Sunstein, Public Values,
Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP. Cr. REv. 127.
81. See, e.g., Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and
the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 6S3, 6S4-63 (197S); Sunstein, supra note 80, at 129-30;
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 9S HARV. L. REv. S37 (1982).
82. Westen, supra note 81, at S60; see also J. LUCAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLmcs 2SO-Sl
(1966).
83. Westen, supra note 81, at S49. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
273 (1977).
84. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 8, at 237; see also Conant, supra note SO, at 818-23, 829-30;
Maltz, supra note 76, at 323.
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public funds, and police regulation were routine (p. 138). As Professor Nelson articulates the dilemma:
The very essence of all law is to discriminate - to separate out the occasions on which one legal consequence rather than an opposite one will
obtain. A theory that the state should treat all people equally cannot
mean that the state may never treat two people differently, for such a
theory would mean the end of all law. In order to sustain a principle of
equality under law - the principle for which the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were striving, it is necessary to have some theory
about when discrimination is appropriate and when it is not. [p. 138]

But what is the theory? The antebellum history of equal protections provides some elements of a general theory, some weak and
strong forces that need to be taken into account, but no unified theory
of equality. Classifications that express a raw preference for some individuals or classes over others, involving little concern for the general
public good, are disfavored. The law should not favor the rich over
the poor. Further, closed classifications and those involving immutable characteristics are greater restrictions on liberty than open classifications. If a special law allows only John Jones a discharge in
bankruptcy or a divorce in particular circumstances, the law not only
creates a class consisting of one person but also a closed class, to
which no other person can fit himself or herself. As a prima facie
matter, the law appears to be more concerned with favoring one citizen over others than it is with advancing the general good. The same
problem occurs if a law is enacted to favor or disfavor people with red
hair (p. 180). By contrast, if a tax is levied on real but not personal
property, an individual may choose, perhaps with great difficulty,
which form of property to hold. Open classifications of this type allow
individuals to exercise their liberty more fully, giving them more control of the legal consequences of their decisions.
In addition, the role of tradition and cultural norms is difficult to
deny. In examining the decisions of the Supreme Court in the late
nineteenth century, Professor Nelson notes that the Court's decisions
on the legitimacy of particular classifications often reflected prevailing
attitudes among Americans:
The Court was able . . . to avoid divisive declarations of principle and
focus instead on questions of a more empirical nature about whether
groups classified differently by legislation were, in fact, similar and hence
entitled to equal treatment. At times, the Court was also able to take
advantage of widespread agreement on specific factual assumptions
about whether differences between people would justify legislation treating them differently. Thus in Bradwell it could rest on the widely shared
perception that women should have a different social role than men,
while in Bartemeyer it could rely on the shared understanding that prohibition laws were not enacted so that the class of nondrinkers would
improve their welfare at the expense of drinkers, but in order to enhance
the well-being of all. [p. 178]
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The incoherence of theory, of course, arises precisely because the
intellectual underpinnings of equal protection could so easily come
into conflict or be construed in different, ways. To make the most obvious points, classifications involving racial and ethnic minorities and
women may be traditional or largely affirmed in popular culture, and
yet such classifications may be closed and evidence a crude preference
for some classes of people over others. Most user fees imposed by
government favor the affluent over the poor, and yet such fees are
wiqely upheld. Some closed classifications, for example the selection
of persons of a particular minimum age for military service, do not
appear to reflect a class bias and may be defended on general welfare
grounds.
From this perspective, and whatever the ambiguities, the constitutional affirmation of equality under the law and the resistance to retroactive laws and bills of attainder speak more generally to a larger
principle of enhancing liberty. Every law or tax bespeaks a denial of
liberty, as Jeremy Bentham once noted, but laws designed only to disfavor particular groups or to create closed classes are perhaps the most
egregious denials of liberty, for they deny mature persons responsibility for their actions. 85 The principle might be described as one of
equal liberty or freedom. In this sense, state court decisions striking
down special legislation and the evolution of fourteenth amendment
protections for African-Americans and other groups both speak to the
same underlying evils.
This approach to equal protection does not dispose of many of the
most vexing dilemmas created by the concept. Whether a classification is based on legitimate dissimilarities - for example, whether and
when children are incapable of making decisions for themselves - will
spark disagreement, and cultural norms may well prevail. Children
often are not governed by general laws, and their liberties often do not
stand on the same footing as those of adults. Nor will there be consensus concerning which exigencies justify liberty-diminishing distinctions. The abstract principles embraced by the framers of the
fourteenth amendment do not easily settle concrete disputes.
But one should not underestimate the impact of the historical roots
of equality under law on modem equal protection theory. 86 For example, the majority opinion in Morey v. Doud 87 - a case that, unfortuSS. See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 131: "In brief, the Court requires differential treatment to be justified by reference to some public value. A justification that rests on the intrinsic value of
treating one person differently from another is prohibited." See also B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Bennett, supra note 80.
86. See, e.g., Bennett supra note 80; Sunstein, supra note 80.
87. 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Compare Morey (Illinois statute prohibiting currency exchanges
from doing business on the premises of another business, but specifically exempting the American Express Co. from the prohibition, denies ccimpetitors equal protection under the 14th
Amendment.) with Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 184 (1935) (Although
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nately, the Supreme Court later overruled as it rushed to abandon
judicial review in the economic sphere88 - relies on the closed nature
of a classification to invalidate a law under the equal protection clause;
this analysis of closed classifications finds parallels in discussions of
immutable biological differences, when the Justices determine whether
a group constitutes a "suspect" class. 89 But one also should not underestimate the differences between a liberty-based or equality-underlaw theory of equal protection and other glosses that have been placed
on that provision.
Professor John Hart Ely, in an analysis that extrapolates from the
historical plight of African-Americans to political structure, urges that
the equal protection clause should be seen as protecting the openness
of political processes. 90 Equal protection is to be afforded to "discrete
and insular" minorities, to use the famous phrase, 91 and it should seek
to open the pluralistic processes of governance in a democracy to those
who have been politically isolated. Clearly, this approach draws on
the racial origins of the equal protection clause, and it has much to
commend it. But the Ely approach fails as a unitary theory of equal
protection, for it overlooks the other intellectual currents underlying
equality under law {p. 200). Professor Douglas Laycock aptly identifies the problem, for there is no historical basis for limiting the equal
protection clause to such discrete and insular minorities, 92 thereby elevating one vision of equal protection over all others. Equal protection
may have its most immediate and important application to racial minorities and those who share similar characteristics, but it is not limited to such groups:
On any given issue, anybody can be discriminated against by a majority
running roughshod over his interests, no matter how powerful he is more
generally. The Constitution's recognition of this argues strongly against
Ely's view that whites are largely left out of the equal protection clause
because they do not need the protection .
. . . [Ely attempts] an impossible distinction between cases in which a
group that is fairly represented in the political process loses on a particular issue or series of issues and cases in which a group is permanently
excluded from effective political participation by the refusal of other
groups to deal with it. 93
the contested legislation did not operate to grant a monopoly, still, such a grant, if otherwise an
appropriate exercise of the state's police power, is not void as denying equal protection.).
88. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See generally Conant, supra note 50, at 738.
89. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 n.14 (1981).
90. J. ELY, supra note 31.
91. United States v. Carotene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See generally
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982).
92. Laycock, supra note 39, at 378.
93. Id. at 380-81 (citation omitted); see also Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality:
Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEXAS L. REV. 1029 (1980).
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Equally important, Professor Ely ignores the fact that equal protection is for individuals, 94 with group membership being important
largely because government should not penalize an individual for
ascribed characteristics that he or she shares with others. The equal
protection clause makes no mention of groups; it says that "any person" is entitled to equal protection.95 An individual's rights should
not turn only on whether there is an entire class of powerless victims. 96 Finally, in the Ely vision, a modem functional approach to
politics, informed by the first amendment and the republican form of
government clause, substitutes itself for the vision of personal liberty
and autonomy held by many nineteenth-century advocates of equal
protection. 97
The historical vision of equal protection, focusing on class legislation and the equal provision of liberties, is reflected more strongly,
however, in the "public value" approach advocated in recent years by
Professor Cass Sunstein and Dean Robert Bennett. 98 The equal protection clause, from their perspective, forbids "unprincipled" discriminations that are premised on the view that "it is intrinsically desirable
to treat one person better than another." 99 It rejects the notion of
"rationality" review; for rational relationship tests for assessing the fit
between means and ends are meaningless unless the equal protection
clause limits "the universe of permissible statutory purposes."Ioo Indeed, most laws may not be analytically rational, but may simply reflect a legitimate political bargaining process - the law passed was the
best one possible given conflicting values and goals and the need to
achieve a majority.IOI It requires, however, that laws must be general.
"When the government operates to benefit A and burden B, it may do
so only if it is prepared to justify its decision by reference to a public
value. A bare decision to prefer A to B, because the comparative disadvantage is intrinsically desirable, is not sufficient."I 02
The public value approach is reflected, albeit somewhat erratically,
94. As Professor Laycock states,
Only by assessing the political power of a group can [Ely] determine whether legislation
affecting that group adversely is suspect. His view that women may waive their right to
equal treatment by not pressing hard enough for it politically also highlights his focus on
groups as the unit of analysis.
Laycock, supra note 39, at 378 (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at 378.
96. Id. at 378-79.
97. Id. at 383.
98. See Bennett, supra note 80; Sunstein, supra note 80; see also Bice, Rationality Analysis in
Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
99. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 128.
100. Id. at 130.
101. See Linde, supra note 80; Yudof, Plato's Ideal and the Perversity of Politics (Book Review), 81 MICH. L. REv. 730 (1983).
102. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 134.
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in constitutional history. According to Professor Nelson, James Bradley Thayer, the famous constitutional law scholar, told his students
that the "first question [in equal protection analysis] is whether there
is a rational public reason for [the classification]. A class cannot be
selected because they have red hair, but ... [only] on the ground of
some rational public reason" (p. 180; citation omitted). Justice Stephen Field also sought to distinguish between class legislation and
run-of-the-riiill legislative classifications. Consider this passage from
Field's decision for the Court in Barbier v. Connolly: 103
Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits - for supplying
water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks,
and many other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with
more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed,
not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to
promote ... the general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily
special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if
they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some
and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out
a public purpose, is limited in its application ... is not within the [fourteenth] amendment.104

Concurring with Bennett and Sunstein, Professor Richard Kay argues
that the vision of equal protection embodied in such decisions is that a
"mere preference of one group over another, that is, legislation based
only on favoritism or on spite, is outside the scope of proper governmental activity." 105
Note three things about the "public value" approach to equal protection. First, race is simply one example of an unjustifiable classification.106 A law may involve unconstitutional class legislation even
though there is little analogy to the plight of African-Americans. As
Senator Jacob Howard, a floor leader for the fourteenth amendment,
said about the equal protection clause, "it abolishes all class legislation
in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of
persons to a code not applicable to another." 107 Second, public values
or legitimate governmental objectives are defined so as to exclude class
or racial bias. This is fully consistent with Professor Nelson's history
of the fourteenth amendment. Third, the line between class prejudice
and reasonable regulation is so difficult to draw - often either explanation may be plausible for a particular law - that there is enormous
temptation to adopt a motivation test. What was the purpose of the
law? Was it enacted only to favor or disfavor a particular class of
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

113 U.S. 27 (1885).
113 U.S. at 31-32.
Kay, supra note 15, at 696.
Id.
Frank & Munro, supra note 40, at 441.
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citizens, or was there some overarching public welfare purpose? Are
the injuries imposed on the losers simply incidental to accomplishing
another proper purpose or was the infliction of the loss the primary
goal in the first place?
One advantage to the "public value" standard is that it does not
turn on only a functional view of politics, with the overlay of modern
theories of pluralism; rather, it focuses on the nature of the classifications and admits of the application of equal protection to all persons
- not just powerless minorities. 108 But, as Professor Sunstein admits,
the inquiry into motivation is treacherous, requiring a rather refined
and sophisticated inquiry into legislative purposes. 109 Succinctly, legislatures may not reveal their real reasons for creating a classification,
or there may be no consensus among legislators on the purpose of a
measure. 110 Equally important, however, legislatures generally believe
that their enactments further public values. They may believe that
racially segregated neighborhoods and schools will promote racial harmony, or that laws discriminating against women workers promote
the well-being of families. If there is something wrong with these classifications, one must either have a restricted definition of "public values" or hold the view that some classifications, even in furtherance of
legitimate public values, are impermissible.

IV
In this Part, I explore the idea that the historical concept of equal
protection, rooted in the nineteenth-century commitment to equality
under law and animus to class legislation, is fully applicable to discrimination on the basis of sex. 11 1 The issue should be framed with
some care. If history in the sense of the specific intentions of the framers of the fourteenth amendment is treated as decisive, my assertion is
most assuredly incorrect. 112 Classification by sex was widely accepted
as legitimate in the nineteenth century, presumably being based on
widespread sentiments (at least among men) that such laws were reasonable and did not involve class legislation.
There is little evidence in the debates over the fourteenth amendment of a specific concern with sex discrimination. Professor Nelson
devotes a number of pages to the question, but the historical record is
sparse. (pp. 136-38, 152, 165-66) Leading feminists opposed adoption
of the fourteenth amendment because it inserted the word "male" into
108. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 131-35.
109. Id. at 131.
110. See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980).
111. The argument made here is drawn from D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER
JUSTICE 116-20 (1986).
112. See generally J. POLE, supra note 59, at 174-76.
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the Constitution for the first time, implying that state governments
could deny women the vote; 113 they unsuccessfully sought to add sex
to the list of impermissible bases for denying suffrage under the fifteenth amendment. 114 Their position, however, found some sporadic
support. For example, Republican Senator John B. Henderson "was
one of a very few who found it difficult to understand why, under
section two of the [fourteenth] amendment, states should be deprived
of representation if blacks were not allowed to vote but would suffer
no similar penalty if women were denied the franchise" (p. 137). He
opined that the "distinction was a mere matter of temporary expediency" and that "[i]f there be no principle involved, then the amendment should not be made" (pp. 137-38; citation omitted).
Republican proponents of the fourteenth amendment, who were
opposed to including women within the ambit of equal protection, responded in a variety of ways. Some urged that women were not the
equals of men (p. 138). Thaddeus Stevens, invoking a common prestidigitation with the concept of equality, simply said that "'[w]hen a
distinction is made between two married people or two femmes sole,
then it is unequal legislation; but where all of the same class are dealt
with in the same way then there is no pretense of inequality' " (p. 139;
citation omitted). Others argued that women were adequately repre-sented by their male fathers, husbands, and friends (p. 138). Charles
Sumner simply opined that it was not the right political moment for
women:
[He] wanted to leave the question "whether women shall be invested
with the elective franchise ... untouched, contenting myself with saying,
that it is obviously the great question of the future, which will be easily
settled, whenever the women in any considerable proportion insist that it
shall be settled." For nearly all Republicans, "the enfranchisement of
women and the enfranchisement of the blacks" bad to remain separate
and distinct since 1866 was "'the negro's hour' .... " [p. 137]

The issue of sex discrimination often entered into the discussions of
the framers of the fourteenth amendment in ways analogous to the
consideration of sex in the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, almost a hundred years later: opponents and not proponents
of the amendment argued for the broader interpretation. Conservatives urged that equality under law, as embodied in the post-Civil War
amendments, is a unitary concept, that "if you wrong the African ...
you wrong the woman. She has the same natural right to vote that the
African has." 115 Senator Edgar Cowan, in the debate over the Civil
113. Section 2 of the amendment reads in part: "But when the right to vote ••• is denied to
any of the male inhabitants ... , the basis of representation therein shall be reduced •. , ." U.S.
CoNsr. amend. XIV,§ 2 (emphasis added).
114. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & s. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE
LAW 4 (1975).
115. J. POLE, supra note 59, at 175 (quoting James Dixon).

May 1990]

Equal Protection

1389

Rights Act of 1866, was even more emphatic:
[The Act confers] ... upon married women, upon minors, upon idiots,
upon lunatics, and upon everybody native born in all the States, the right
to make and enforce contracts, because there is no qualification in the
bill, and the very object of the bill is to override the qualifications that
are upon those rights in the States. [p. 107; footnote omitted]

By expansively interpreting equality notions to include women and .
others, opponents of equal protection hoped to ridicule the fourteenth
amendment and to show its unwisdom. 116 Most radical Republicans
did not rise to the bait, but a few did proceed "from the principle of
equality as applied to individuals regardless of property or race to
equality regardless of sex." 117 The impression is that many radicals
well understood the implications of their principles for women, but,
largely for fear of providing ammunition to opponents of the fourteenth amendment, they chose not to address specifically the question
of sex discrimination by the states.11s
If one agrees with Leonard Levy, however, that "[t]he principles
and not their framers' understanding and application of them are
meant to endure," 119 then there is a strong case for treating sex classifications as illegitimate under the equal protection clause. To demonstrate this point, I tum to a much vilified source of constitutional
principles, Herbert Spencer's Social Statics; or, The Conditions Essential to Human Happiness, first published in 1851. Spencer was a British contemporary of the framers of the fourteenth amendment, and he
drew upon many of the same intellectual traditions of liberal philosophy and social Darwinism that they did.
To focus on the work of Herbert Spencer is to invite the contempt
of generations of constitutionalists, for Spencer is identified with the
worst excesses of substantive due process between the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment and the ascension of the New Deal Court in
the late 1930s. In the most infamous substantive due process case in
constitutional history, Lochner v. New York, 120 Justice Holmes ensured that every law student would come to know the evil wrought by
Mr. Spencer. In that case, Holmes vehemently dissented from the majority's decision to declare unconstitutional a New York law limiting
the hours of employment of bakery employees. Holmes was incensed
by what he believed was the substitution of the majority's own political and economic philosophy for that of the legislature in the guise of
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 174-75.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 175-76.

L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY 309 (1960).

w.

120. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally
SWINDLER, CoURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY, 1889-1932 (1969); Benedict, supra note 45.
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constitutional law. And, in perhaps the most famous put-down in
American judicial history, he chastised his fellow justices for reading
Herbert Spencer's brand of utilitarian philosophy into the
Constitution:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of
the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do
with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled
by various decisions of this court that ... state laws may regulate life in
many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you
like as tyrannical as this . . . . The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes
so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same,
which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered
with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he
likes it or not. The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. 121

Justice Holmes quite obviously was familiar with Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 122 and, despite the disclaimer that he had not made
up his mind on Spencer's theory, he clearly was not thrilled by the
insights of an unreconstructed nineteenth-century liberal - at least
where they were to be imposed by courts. 123 Spencer opposed government administration of schools as an unnecessary and totalitarian impulse, 124 he thought that government delivery of the mail was based on
the infringement of the liberty of those who were forbidden from competing, 12s and he viewed virtually all taxes as an assault on liberty, 126
including taxes to support public health and sanitation measures. 127
He also felt that state interference with the liberty to exchange one's
property or labor was one of "the worst violations of human
rights." 128
But in areas not dealing with regulation of commerce, taxation,
and public services, Spencer expressed views that Justice Holmes
might have found more compatible with his constitutional principles.
Spencer, ever the rigorous devotee of liberal philosophy, methodically
121. 198 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
122. H. SPENCER, supra note 1. The views of Justice Holmes on Spencer and Social Darwinism are complex, and the reader should consult the excellent work of Professor Hovenkamp. See
Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 645, 660-64 (1985).
123. Hovenkamp, supra note 122, at 660-61.
124. H. SPENCER, supra note I, at 360-65.
125. Id. at 440.
126. Id. at 307.
127. Id. at 407.
128. Id. at 329.
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and rigidly applied that philosophy to all manner of legal and policy
questions, allowing it to lead him where it may. For example, he argued that "nothing is to be feared from the most uncontrolled utterances of thought and feeling," 129 a position on freedom of expression
more akin to, though perhaps more absolutist than, that of Justice
Holmes. In the present context, however, I wish to explore Spencer's
conception of equality under law, a conception that bears marked similarities to the Framers' own contemporaneous vision.
Spencer's basic thesis in Social Statics is that "man's happiness can
only be produced by· the exercise of his faculties" and that to exercise
those faculties "he must have liberty to do all that his faculties naturally impel him to do." 130 Man thus "has a right to that liberty," and
such a right fulfills the Divine will. 131 The problem is that liberties
may conflict, and thus there arises the need for limits on liberty. 132 He
then embraces the Millian proposition 133 "that every man may claim
the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man." 134 But in the practical world
of human affairs "detailed knowledge" of the "human constitution"
and the consequences of human action are "unattainable," and hence
the only practical solution is that "the law of equal freedom" should
be recognized as the only "limit to the exercise of the faculties." 135
The argument becomes murkier at this point, but it apparently is
along the lines that equal constraints on liberty, inflicting benefit or
harm on everyone, will lead to the abandonment of limitations on liberty that are not required to avoid inflicting injury on others.1 36 Thus,
he concludes:
Freedom being the prerequisite to normal life in the individual, equal
freedom becomes the prerequisite to normal life in society. And if this
law of equal freedom is the primary law of right relationship between
man and man, then no desire to get fulfilled a secondary law can warrant
us in breaking it. 137

Spencer's basic proposition of "equal freedom" bears a great similarity to the antebellum notions of equality under law and the need for
general laws that do not favor a particular class. And, like his contemporaries in America, he also is better at articulating the general theory
than in working through all of its applications. He is remarkably si129. Id. at 171.
130. Id. at 93.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
134. H. SPENCER, supra note 1, at 93-94.
135. Id. at 102.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 106. William Graham Sumner, an American Social Darwinist, took a similar
view of the meaning of equality. See Hovenkamp, supra note 122, at 669.

Michigan Law Review

1392

[Vol. 88:1366

lent on the question of how one distinguishes between a violation of
equal freedom and the advancement of legitimate state objectives
through laws that classify people. Perhaps this is less of a problem for
him because he sees such a limited role for government. But what is
intriguing about Spencer's concept of equal freedom is that he saw it
as fully applicable to women and protective of their liberties:
Equity knows no difference of sex. In its vocabulary the word man must
be understood in a generic, and not in a specific sense. The law of equal
freedom manifestly applies to the whole race - female as well as male.
The same a priori reasoning which establishes that law for men ... may
be used with equal cogency on behalf of women. The Moral Sense, by
virtue of which the masculine mind responds to that law, exists in the
feminine mind as well. Hence the several rights deducible from that law
must appertain equally to both sexes. 138

Spencer devotes an entire chapter of Social Statics to "The Rights
ofWomen" 139 and he is at great pains to establish that the principle of
equal freedom does not permit discrimination based on sex. He denies
that "the differences of bodily organization, and those trifling mental
variations which distinguish female from male, should exclude onehalf of the race from the benefits" of equal freedom. 140 The burden of
proof lies with those who would deny that women are the equals of
men and assert that they are "creatures of an inferior order," 14 1 and he
concludes that no such showing can be made. 142 He also suggests that
even if he is wrong on his facts, the argument for nondiscrimination
against women is compelling:
Not only, however, does the theory ... fall to pieces under the mere
process of inspection; it is absurd on the very face of it . . . . For what is
it that we mean by rights? Nothing else than freedom to exercise the
faculties. And what is the meaning of the assertion that woman is mentally inferior to man? Simply that her faculties are less powerful. What
then does the dogma, that because woman is mentally inferior to man
she has less extensive rights, amount to? Just this - that because woman has weaker faculties than man, she ought to have like liberty with
him, to exercise the faculties she has! 14 3

Spencer's conclusion, which might easily have been reached by a
modern court, is that judgments about the relative capacities of women are likely to be based on stereotypes and not facts and that, in any
event, the principle of equal freedom would allow women to exercise
whatever faculties they possess. There simply is no need to reinforce
the stereotypes through law, whatever one's view of their correctness.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

H. SPENCER, supra note 1, at 173.
at 173-91.
at 173.
at 173-74.
at 175.
at 177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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His conclusion is that the unequal treatment of women and blacks is
more a function of the selfishness of the dominant groups than it is a
function of the logical application of the principle of equal freedom. 144
Indeed, he confides that once the arguments for the unequal treatment
of women are no longer left to tacit understanding 145 but are brought
into the open, "Few will have [the] hardihood to assert" their
inferiority. 146
Spencer's conclusion that women were entitled to equality under
the law does not necessarily mean that his vision was embraced in the
concept of equal protection in the fourteenth amendment. Justice
Holmes' admonition is still well recalled. But there were signs, however inchoate, that American law was moving in that direction even
prior to the adoption of the amendrilent. In the first half of the nineteenth century, women had benefited enormously from the movement
away from status and toward individual liberty, even if that movement
was more a reflection of economic changes than of changing perceptions of the place of women. 147 In 1839, Mississippi recognized the
legal capacity of women, and by 1850 about half of the states had
enacted laws recognizing the property rights of married women. 148
These new laws were not extensively debated in legislative bodies, and
they did not receive significant attention in the press. 149 Litigation
arising out of the Married Women's Property Acts was largely initiated by creditors, with very few cases litigated between husbands and
wives. Lawrence Friedman describes these laws as the ratification of a
"silent revolution."150
Friedman's description gives us a clue to the profound difficulties
of discussing sex classifications and the scheme of the fourteenth
amendment. Sex classifications disadvantaging women were largely
viewed as paternalistic and benign. 151 Where such paternalism appeared ill-suited and inconsistent with economic necessity, significant
changes were made in state laws. Thus, sex discrimination simply was
not viewed as a problem by many, and state bans on special legislation
and provisions on equality under law generally were not invoked to
strike down such discrimination. This inability to recognize sex classifications as inconsistent with equality under law carried over into the
debates over the fourteenth amendment.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id at 178-79.
Id at 173.
Id. at 174.

L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 186.
H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 11, at 51. See generally Chusecl, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983).
149. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 186.
150. Id
151. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 119.
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But status came to take on a larger meaning after the Civil War,
referring to the assignment of legal rights and obligations on the basis
of ascribed and not achieved characteristics. 152 It is interesting to note
in this regard that the Civil War amendments to the Constitution
make reference to two types of status distinctions. The thirteenth
amendment, abolishing slavery, naturally refers to slavery and involuntary servitude. 153 The fourteenth amendment makes no reference to
slavery at all. But the fifteenth amendment states that the rights of
citizen of the United States to vote shall not be abridged "on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 154 Arbitrariness
Ues in classifying persons in accordance with their birthrights (slave
status) or other characteristics (race) over which they have little or no
control; a reasonable classification takes into account their wills, the
things they are able to choose to do or not do within the limits of their
capacities and the social order. 15 5
Until the twentieth century, litigants attacking the constitutionality of unequal treatment of women under the law relied almost exclusively on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment, not equal protection. 156 In the Slaughter-House Cases, 157
the Supreme Court effectively read the privileges and immunities
clause out of the fourteenth amendment; one day later, in Bradwell v.
State, 158 the Court held that denying Myra Bradwell a license to practice law on the basis of her sex did not violate the privileges and immunities clause. 159 The following Term, in Minor v. Happersett, 16o the
Court unanimously rejected a woman's insistence that a state statute
rendering her ineligible to vote in national elections violated the privileges and immunities clause.
Perhaps it is worth pausing to consider the Slaughter-House and
Minor cases. Distinguished historians such as Charles Fairman have
found it intriguing that the first Supreme Court case to construe directly the privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment involved Southern whites, who
wished to challenge "carpetbagger" legislation, and not black victims
152. See F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 154. See generally P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. xv, § I.
155. See F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 170.
156. See R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1981).
157. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
158. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
159. Compare Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1872) with In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 34 N.E.
641 (1893) (Neither the Indiana Constitution nor its laws deny women the right to practice law
in the state, and upon application, and proper evidence, they are entitled to admission to the
bar.).
160. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
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of discrimination. 161 More than a thousand butchers were put out of
work by the legislation, and their contention was that the establishment of the slaughter-house monopoly, largely through bribery in the
Louisiana legislature, deprived them of the liberty to pursue a lawful
employment. 162 The plaintiffs' briefs drew on old English law concerning monopolies, and on an array of learning and natural law to
establish that liberty to pursue one's chosen employment was a protected constitutional privilege. 163 The standard explanation for this
extraordinary appeal by white southerners to a constitutional amendment addressed to protecting blacks is that the plaintiffs had no choice
since Louisiana courts were dominated by unsympathetic carpetbaggers.164 In addition, the butchers hired former Supreme Court Justice
John A. Campbell to represent them, and it was thought that he might
"captivate the minds of the Justices."16s
The Court's resolution of the case has been attacked from many
quarters. 166 A five-Justice majority held that plaintiffs had not been
denied any protected privileges and immunities, and, in a few tortuously reasoned passages, forever sapped that clause of any significant
meaning. 167 Justice Miller also expressed his "doubt ... whether any
action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the
negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of [the fourteenth amendment]."1 68
But whatever the Court's treatment of the natural law and equality-under-law components of the amendment, many applauded the
majority's unwillingness to embrace a laissez-faire philosophy in the
garb of constitutional doctrine. 169 For a brief time at least, the Justices were not swayed by Mr. Herbert Spencer's utilitarian philosophy.
Conversely, the dissenters took a broader view of privileges and immunities, but appeared to lay the groundwork for now-repudiated notions
of substantive due process and the need to protect economic liberties
161. 6 c. FAIRMAN, HISfORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: REcoNSfRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88: PART ONE 1308 (1971) (The Slaughter-House Case "was
all out of accord with what members of Congress had had in mind in their debates.").
162. Id. at 1321-32; see also 2 c. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY S33-61 (1932); Conant, supra note SO, at 823-28.
163. See 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSflTUTIONAL LAW S3S-683 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 197S). See generally
Conant, supra note SO.
164. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1319. But see Conant, supra note SO.
16S. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1319.
166. See, e.g., L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 194-98 (197S); Conant, supra note SO, at 825-26;
Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (19S4).
167. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); see also L. LUSKY, supra note 166,
at 194-98.
168. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81; see p. 162.
169. See, e.g., C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1370-74; H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 113.
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from government regulation. 170 These interpretations of the Slaughter-House Cases have much to commend them, as does the view that a
conservative majority on the Court was seeking to restrain the very
federal power that radical Republican Congresses had sought to expand.171 The result in this case may well have turned more on conceptions of federalism and of appropriate limits on federal courts than a
careful parsing of the terms of the fourteenth amendment (pp. 162-63).
While, to be sure, the various opinions and briefs in the SlaughterHouse Cases are confused and conflicting, reflecting the complexity of
the issues and the paucity of federal precedents, 172 there is an alternative hypothesis that would explain the filing of such a suit (pp. 15860). The Louisiana statute named seventeen specific incorporators of
the Crescent City Company who were to benefit from the monopolycreating law 173 and the public health rationale for the statute may
have been a blatant subterfuge for special legislation to benefit a
known and identified small group of citizens. 174 From this perspective, the claims of the plaintiffs flowed naturally from the conception
of equal protection that preceded the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment (p. 156). The class was closed, and the beneficiaries were
specifically named and not identified by their superior capacity to
carry out particular functions. The law was not general and abstract;
it favored a particular set of individuals. One may concede that Louisiana may regulate slaughter-houses for the general welfare, compelling them to locate outside of New Orleans, without conceding that it
has the power to pass such special legislation. 175 Indeed, one reading
of Justice Miller's majority opinion is that he agreed with this statement of principle but disagreed on its application to the facts of the
case (pp. 158-60).
Unfortunately, Justice Miller also sought to support his decision
against the butchers with arguments that the fourteenth amendment
only protected African-Americans. He did so, however, in complete
disregard of history. Professor Nelson is exactly right in pointing out
the error of Miller's ways:
Justice Miller's approaches for narrowing the reach of section one were
170. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1385. See Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor:
Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767; Conant, supra note 50, at 828
n.198. See generally Kay, supra note 15.
171. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1321. See also Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights,
and Limits on Constitutional Change 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1987).
172. For example, the plaintiffs' attorney in his brief discussed the 1848 Republican Constitution of France, Macaulay, Fortescue, and numerous English cases on monopolies. See Kurland & Casper, supra note 163, at 550-62.
'
173. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1322.
174. Id. at 1322-23; see also Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Assn. v. Crescent City LiveStock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 653 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (Bradley, J.).
175. Professor Conant reaches the same conclusion through a historical reconstruction of the
privileges and immunities clause. See Conant, supra note 50.
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flatly inconsistent with the history of its framing in Congress and its
ratification by the state legislatures. . . . While equality for blacks was
surely the central concern of the amendment's framers and ratifiers, it
was never their sole and exclusive concern. Those who discussed the
amendment were aware of its implications for other groups, such as Chinese, Indians, women, and religious minorities. Moreover, there is no
doubt that the proponents of the amendment meant to protect yet another group - namely, Northern whites who were migrating to the
South after the Civil War and were threatened with potentially discriminatory legislation at the hands of Southern states and localities. It was
simply wrong for Justice Miller to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment could be limited only to cases of discrimination against blacks. [p.
163]

Thus, by unnecessarily going beyond the narrowest ground on which
his decision might have rested, perhaps to reply to the assertions of the
dissenters (p. 162), Justice Miller did incalculable damage to fourteenth amendment jurisprudence. In one opinion he managed to demolish the natural law and equality-under-law underpinnings that
were so much in evidence only a few years earlier.
Justice Field, perceiving an equal protection component in the
privileges and immunities clause, 176 adhered to an equality-under-law
approach when he opined that government might provide for exclusive
franchises in extraordinary circumstances or regulate generally for the
public convenience, but this is very different "from a grant, with exclusive privileges, of a right to pursue one of the ordinary trades or callings of life, which is a right appertaining solely to the individual." 177
It is one thing to proscribe regulations for all, even if it impedes employment choices, and quite another to name those citizens who may
pursue a calling and those who may not: "The fourteenth amendment, in my judgment, makes it essential to the validity of the legislation of every State that this equality of right should be respected." 178
Lest one accuse Field of too radical a bent, he defined equality of liberty in the following terms: "To [citizens of the United States] everywhere, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without
other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others of
the same age, sex, and condition." 179 Thus, with the addition of race
to the list of impermissible classifications, Field saw equality-underlaw in very much the same terms as Jacksonians forty years earlier.
The contention that the Slaughter-House Cases raised issues within
the core of the concerns of the framers of the fourteenth amendment is
reinforced by reactions to the decision in Louisiana. 18° For example,
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 826-27.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 88 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110.
See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1371-74, 1379-80.
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when Francies R. T. Nichols, the candidate for Governor of the Democratic Party in 1876, finally ousted the Republican regime, he declared
"that he would 'carry out faithfully and impartially the amendments
to the Constitution' and that he was 'utterly opposed to class legislation.' " 181 In 1881, the city council of New Orleans abolished the monopoly pursuant to an 1879 state constitutional amendment. 182 The
company challenged the abolition as a violation of the contract clause,
and in 1884 the Supreme Court unanimously sustained the law. 183
In a concurring opinion in the second litigation, Justice Field covered much of the same ground as in his dissenting opinion in the first
case, arguing that only age, sex, and condition might be taken into
account in distinguishing among ascribed characteristics of persons. 184
But he also sharpened his views. The fourteenth amendment did not
"limit the subjects upon which the States can legislate":
They can now, as then, legislate to promote health, good order and
peace, to develop their resources, enlarge their industries, and advance
their prosperity. It only inhibits discriminating and partial enactments,
favoring some to the impairment of the rights of others. The principal, if
not the sole, purpose of its prohibitions is to prevent arbitrary invasion
by State authority of the rights of person and property, and to secure to
every one the right to pursue his happiness unrestrained, except by just,
equal, and impartial laws.18 5
Justice Bradley's concurring opinion was equally emphatic. The
states might constitutionally apply "general regulations, applying
equally to all, as the general good may demand .... "1 86 But Louisiana's monopoly law violated "the last clause of the section - 'no State
shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.' "
If it is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws to grant to one
man, or set of men, the privilege of following an ordinary calling in a
large community, and to deny it to all others, it is difficult to understand
what would come within the constitutional prohibition.187
In Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 188 Justice Bradley had said much the same
thing. The tragedy of later Court decisions is that they ignored the
equal protection principles inherent in the earlier Field and Bradley
positions and the concessions to state regulatory power, and chose to
181. Id. at 1379.
182. Id. at 1380.
183. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
184. 111 U.S. at 757 (Field, J., concurring).
185. 111 U.S. at 759; see also American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900);
Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
See generally Kay, supra note 15.
186. 111 U.S. at 763 (Bradley, J., concurring).
187. 111 U.S. at 765-66 (Bradley, J., concurring).
188. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873).
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amplify the looser language relating to the right to pursue a calling or
business. As Professor Gordon has noted:
Men like Cooley, Dillon, Field and Miller, who helped put the structure
together, were old Jacksonians and intensely suspicious of corporate
privilege. Their desire to limit legislative power stemmed as much from
terror of a corrupt legislative-corporate alliance as from the specter of
radicalism; they wanted to eliminate all legal patronage of particularism.
Besides, [the theory] did not condemn the exercise of state power as long
as it remained within its proper sphere, and the extensive regulation of
public service corporations, occupations, and morals in the late nineteenth century ... showed how broad the sphere could be. 189
The Minor decision 190 casts some light on the discomfiture of the
nation's highest court with state-sanctioned sex discrimination, despite
its tolerance of such inequalities under the law. The Minor Court
went to considerable lengths to confirm the fact that women were citizens of the United States and persons under the Constitution. It noted
that women were members of the polity, that the Constitution was
established by "the people," including women, and that (in contrast to
its discredited decision in the Dred Scott case on blacks) women had
long been treated as citizens for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states. 191 The
Chief Justice even opined that "[t]here cannot be a nation without a
people," and that women had always been citizens, the fourteenth
amendment not having affected "the citizenship of women any more
than it did of men."192
·
How then did Mrs. Minor lose her lawsuit? The Court extensively
reviewed the franchise under state constitutions at the time of the
adoption of the federal constitution, and found that the states disenfranchised many citizens, including women. Further, the privileges
and immunities clause of article IV of the Constitution, giving the citizens of each state rights in their several states, 193 had never been construed so as to give a citizen a right to vote in more than one state. In
short, in the absence of express language to the contrary, the Court
concluded that the right to vote was not among the privileges and immunities protected by the fourteenth amendment. 194
This conclusion was bolstered by a logical point: "If suffrage was
one of these privileges or immunities, why amend the Constitution to
prevent its being denied on account of race, etc.?" 195 This reference to
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Gordon, supra note 56, at 92-93 (footnotes omitted).
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165-67.
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165, 170.
U.S. CONST. art. IV.
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 171.
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 175.
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the fifteenth amendment probably confirmed the worst fears of those
feminists who had opposed the fourteenth amendment and attempted
to revise the fifteenth amendment. Women were only vaguely protected by the Constitution, and that protection could easily be
negated. 196
Neither counsel nor the Court in Minor questioned whether a classification by sex, of individuals acknowledged to be citizens and persons under the Constitution, violated the equal protection of the laws.
The Court was more interested in the nature of the interest that had
been affected than in the nature of the classification creating the inequality under the law.
After Minor and the Slaughter-House Cases, federal and state
courts, drawing, however ineptly, on the natural law vision of the
fourteenth amendment, came to pay new attention to the types of substantive interests protected by that amendment in the last years of the
nineteenth century, relying on the due process clause and not the privileges and immunities clause. As Justice Holmes concluded, judges
began with "an unpretentious assertion of the liberty to follow the ordinary callings" and then expanded that "innocuous generality . . .
into the dogma [of] Liberty of Contract." 197 That is, it is one thing to
forbid the states from limiting a profession to named individuals and
quite another to forbid them from regulating a profession to achieve a
public purpose. 198 In this era of substantive due process, the courts
struck down many laws on the theory that they unconstitutionally interfered with a person's freedom to enter into contracts.
The development of substantive due process doctrine raised a novel
issue relating to classifications by sex. If persons were entitled to the
protections of due process oflaw, including the liberty to contract, and
if women were persons, on what basis might women be subject to
greater restrictions on their freedom to contract than men? 199 Though
the analysis could easily have been framed in equal protection terms,
courts declined to proceed in this manner, for they were chiefly concerned with the elaboration of freedom of contract. Statutes discriminating on the basis of sex were rarely attacked prior to 1900, and such
attacks usually failed. 200 In Holden v. Hardy, 201 upholding a Utah law
196. See generally Crozier, Constitutionality ofDiscrimination Based on Sex, 15 B. U. L. RBV.
723 (1935).
197. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See gen·
erally Forbath, supra note 170.
198. See also Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). See generally Forbath, supra note 170;
Kay, supra note 15, at 681-86, 701-05.
199. D. KlRP, M. YuooF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 118. A similar analysis of the
race cases in the progressive era has been undertaken by President Benno Schmidt of Yale. See
Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part /:
The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982).
200. But see Ritchie v. Illinois, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895); People v. Williams, 189 N.Y.
131, 81 N.E. 778 (1907). Ritchie, a case decided in 1895 under the due process clause of the
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that limited the work day of miners, the Supreme Court noted in passing that many states had enacted laws restricting the hours of employment of women and children: "[w]hile their constitutionality, at least
as applied to women, has been doubted in some of the States," wrote
the Court, "they have been generally upheld."202
As previously noted, Lochner v. New York, 203 decided in 1905 by
the U.S. Supreme Court, marked the high-water mark of the era of
substantive due process. A bare majority of the Justices struck down a
law prohibiting the employment of bakers for more than ten hours a
day or sixty hours a week. The New York law interfered with the
liberty of persons to make contracts, the Court reasoned: "There is no
contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are
not able to assert their rights and care for themselves .. ·.. " 204 When
Lochner is read in tandem with Holden, the clear implication is that
women are incapable of protecting their own interests and appropriately are treated as wards of the state, 205 a proposition made explicit
three years later in Muller v. Oregon. 206 A unanimous Court in Muller
embraced the proposition that sex is a permissible basis for differentiation, upholding a maximum-hours law applied only to women. 207
Some thoughtful critics have applauded Muller. Constitutional
Illinois Constitution, demonstrates that a contrary view was taken by some courts after the decision in Bradwell, some 22 years earlier. In 1893, the Illinois legislature had enacted a law prohibiting women, whether adults or minors, from working for more than eight hours a day in any
factory or workshop manufacturing clothing or wearing apparel. There were at least eight challenges to the law within a two-year period (apparently all brought by male employers), and the
Illinois Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional. The state argued that the law was
"designed to protect woman on account of her sex and physique." 155 Ill. at 111, 40 N.E. at 458.
The court appeared none too impressed with any law, even one of general application, that
sought to protect people from harmful employment. 155 Ill. at 115, 40 N.E. at 459. But the
court went further. It cited Minor for the proposition that women were citizens and persons, as
fully protected as men by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 155 Ill. at 112, 40
N.E. at 455. Moving to the Illinois state constitution, the court held that women were entitled to
the same rights "to make contracts with reference to [their] labor as are ... men":
The law accords to her, as to every other citizen, the natural right to gain a livelihood by
intelligence, honesty and industry in the arts, the sciences, the professions or other vocations. Before the law, her right to a choice of vocations cannot be said to be denied or
abridged on account of sex.
155 Ill. at 111-12, 40 N.E. at 458 (citation omitted).
The Ritchie decision did not·reflect the prevalent judicial attitude toward special labor legislation for women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ritchie itself was overruled.
Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N.E. 695 (1910). See also Wenham v. Nebraska, 65 Neb.
394, 91 N.W. 421 (1902); Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383 (1876).
201. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
202. 169 U.S. at 395.
203. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
204. 198 U.S. at 57.
205. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456 n.6 (11th ed. 1985).
206. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
207. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 118-19.
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scholar Gerald Gunther has suggested that Lochner erred in accepting
"inequalities of fortune," denying the legitimacy of state efforts to redress such inequalities; he regards Muller a happy exception to such
judicial insensitivity. 208 I disagree. Muller undermines the concept of
equality under law, as embodied' in the fourteenth amendment and in
antebellum state court decisions. Depending on their skills and opportunities, bakers may choose a less dangerous profession or evade a
state-imposed limit on working hours. A woman cannot escape her
sex, for her options have been circumscribed on the basis of an unalterable personal characteristic. The law affirmed in Muller embodied
a close-ended status distinction of precisely the sort that should be
impermissible under the fourteenth amendment. A Court intent upon
preserving liberty and individual autonomy and advancing the public
welfare, while allowing legislatures to redress liberty-constricting inequalities of bargaining power, should have upheld the Lochner law and
overturned the Muller statute.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Muller in 1915, upholding a maximum-hour law applicable only to women. 209 But eight years later, in
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 210 the Justices struck down a federal act
fixing minimum wages for women in the District of Columbia. The
Court declared that the statute was "a naked, arbitrary exercise of
power that . . . cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution of
the United States."211 The Adkins majority had to chart a course
through a treacherous array of precedents. By 1923, the Court had
repudiated Lochner without expressly overruling it, 212 and hence the
Adkins Court could not rely heavily on Lochner. Instead, it chose to
undermine Muller.
The majority opinion in Adkins strongly endorses the equality of
women under the law. The tenor of that opinion is that women had
come a long way since the dark days of Muller. 213 The "ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physi9al," says the Court, "has
continued with 'diminishing intensity.' " 214 While physical differences
"must be recognized in appropriate cases," the Court notes, in language reminiscent of that of Herbert Spencer, that it could not endorse
the notion that mature women were less capable than men of making
208. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on A Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (1972).
209. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); see also Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914)
(per curiam); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914).
210. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 119-20.
211. 261 U.S. at 559.
212. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 205, at 459; see also Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426
(1917); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 563-64 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting).
213. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 119.
214. 261 U.S. at 553.

May 1990]

Equal Protection

1403

contractual decisions for themselves. 215 The trend of modern legislation, "as well as that of common thought and usage," is that women
should be emancipated from laws according them special protections
or restraining their contractual and civil relationships. 216 Since
Muller, "revolutionary" changes in the "contractual, political and
civil status of women," had occurred, and thus "it is not unreasonable
to say that these differences have now come almost, if not quite, to the
vanishing point."217 The culmination of this revolution was the adoption, in 1920, of the nineteenth amendment, extending suffrage to
women.
Adkins advances the proposition that women are entitled to constitutional protection under the fourteenth amendment. Although the
opinion is not couched in the language of equal protection,218 its observations are relevant to equal protection analysis. Women are no
less capable than men of making life choices for themselves, and allegedly protective legislation can be hurtful.
The reliance by the Adkins court on the nineteenth amendment is
well placed. That amendment specifies that the rights of "citizens" to
vote may not be abridged on the basis of sex, thus presuming that
women were already citizens under the Constitution. It reflects the
changes in the status of women that had occurred since the early nineteenth century, extending that trend by removing the greatest remaining obstacle to women's emancipation, their disenfranchisement. In so
doing, it symbolically confirms the view that at least one historical
understanding of equality under the law is inconsistent with statutes
that routinely sort individuals on the basis of their sex.
Adkins, whether a symbol of liberty for women or a misbegotten
judicial assault on legislation protecting workers, could have provided
the starting point for modern fourteenth amendment analysis of sex
discrimination, connecting older conceptions of liberty, citizenship,
and equality under law, with more modern sensitivities to unfairness
based on sex discrimination. This did not occur, however, for the
Supreme Court subsequently ignored Adkins; fifty years later, when
the Court drew on the fourteenth amendment to strike down sex-based
distinctions, Adkins went unmentioned. 21 9
The neglect of Adkins is entirely understandable. For one thing,
sex discrimination was not a serious concern of the Supreme Court in
1923, despite the Adkins opinion. At least three of the newest members of the Court were anxious to resurrect and extend the Lochner
substantive due process approach. Adkins inaugurated a brief period
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

261
261
261
See
See

U.S. at 553.
U.S. at 553.
U.S. at 553.
Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (substantive due process).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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of heightened scrutiny of federal and state interference with freedom
of contract; 220 sex discrimination was an ancillary concern. For another, Adkins marked only a "temporary" victory for equality of the
sexes. As Blanche Crozier, an early student of women's constitutional
rights, observed: "It does not appear that at any time since the adoption of the Constitution has discrimination based on sex been unconstitutional."221 Adkins itself supports this reading.
The Adkins majority attempted to breathe new life into the Lochner rule "forbidding legislative interference with freedom of contract."222 The Court came to regard Adkins as a substantive due
process case, not as a sex discrimination case. In Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 223 for example, decided only a month after Adkins, the
majority cites the case for the proposition that "[w]hile there is no
such thing as absolute freedom of contract and it is subject to a variety
of restraints, they must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Freedom is
the general rule, and restraint the exception. The legislative authority
to abridge can be justified only by exceptional circumstances." 224 Nor
did the Court extend Adkins to other areas of sex discrimination; instead, it resurrected Muller. In Radice v. New York, 225 decided a year
after Adkins, the Court upheld a state law prohibiting women from
night work in restaurants.
Only the narrow holding of Adkins survived its subsequent elaboration. And Adkins itself did not endure. Less than a year after reaffirming Adkins in Morehead v. New York, 226 the Court overruled both
decisions in one of the great New Deal turnabouts, upholding a minimum-wage law applicable only to women. 227 Freedom of contract
was not expressly guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment, the
Court asserted in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, and "regulation which is
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of
the community is due process."228 Adkins incorrectly departed from
these principles, and the state might properly consider that women as
a class receive the least pay, have less bargaining power with employers, and "are the ready victims of those who would take advantage of
their necessitous circumstances. " 229
220. See generally E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1321-26 (1973).
221. Crozier, supra note 196, at 745.
222. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 550, 554 (1923).
223. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
224. 262 U.S. at 534; cf. Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (fair wage law for
women violates due process clause of fourteenth amendment).
225. 264 U.S. 292 (1924); see D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 119-20.
226. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
227. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
228. 300 U.S. at 391.
229. 300 U.S. at 398; see also D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 120.
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The idea of equality under the law for women, its wagon hitched to
the· star of substantive due process, collapsed as that star fell. The
Court was pressed to approve the social and economic legislation of
the New Deal and used the West Coast Hotel case for this purpose. At
a moment of apparent institutional crisis, the Justices were in no mood
for refined distinctions among cases relying on a discredited doctrine. 230 Lochner and Adkins were lumped together, symbols of the
judicial heresy of applying substantive due process in the economic
domain. Adkins has never again b~en cited in a sex discrimination
case.
In the 1948 Goesaert case, 231 the Supreme Court upheld against
equal protection challenge a Michigan law prohibiting a woman from
being licensed as a bartender unless she was " 'the wife or daughter of
the male owner' of a licensed liquor establishment." 232 Goesaert
marked the first time that the Supreme Court was faced with the contention that a sex-based distinction violated the equal protection
clause; it did not treat the moment with great seriousness. In a jocular
three-page opinion, the majority speaks of "the alewife, sprightly and
ribald, in Shakespeare," and notes that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
did not tear history up by the roots." 233
Goesaert blinks at the history of equality under the law. 234 "It
would be an idle parade of familiar learning" to review the relevant
equal protection precedents, says the opinion. 235 The Court forgets
that the equal protection clause applies to "any person'', it does not
speak of the antebellum history of equality under the law, and it ignores the resolution of these concerns in Adkins, a case that could well
have been given new life in equal protection garb. 236
When sex discrimination cases again found their way to the
Supreme Court in the 1970s, the historical underpinnings of the constitutional claims had been lost. The conception of equal protection as
centered on equality under law was obscured by a philosophical and
ideological fixation on "suspect" classifications. The predictable out230. See generally Benedict, supra note 45.
231. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See D. KtRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra
note 111, at 120.
232. 335 U.S. at 465.
233. 335 U.S. at 465.
234. In fairness to the majority, it is not entirely clear whether the Court was lightly dismissing any claim of sex discrimination under the equal protection clause, or whether it was
simply affirming the traditional authority of the states, embodied in the twenty-first amendment,
to regulate the liquor trade. See, e.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). Indeed, the
state's brief in Goesaert argued that "while discriminations against women as such are invalid,
discriminations against them in matters relating to intoxicating liquors have consistently been
upheld." Brief for Appellees at 23, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
235. 335 U.S. at 467.
236. Indeed, the Court opined that the equal protection claim of women is entirely novel,
reflecting new "sociological insight[s]" and "shifting social standards." 335 U.S. at 466.
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come was judicial confusion: "A nation that desiccates its history in
the course of extracting and studying its law risks feeding itself
pap."237

v
What should we make of the disunity of the equal protection
clause, of the multiple traditions upon which it was based, and of the
conflicts among visions of equality under law? Obviously we should
be skeptical of any unifying or monolithic concept that purports to
subject all cases to a single standard. There should be no assumption
that equal protection applies only to racial and ethnic classifications
(p. 163), that all economic classifications are permissible (p. 200), or
that only the powerless need apply for equality under law. The more
encompassing the theory, the more likely that it does not reflect the
diverse origins of the equal protection clause.
There should also be a realization that the multiple historical
strands are reflected in the modem debates over equal protection theories, allowing each warring camp to find solace in the nineteenth-century record. For example, devotees of fundamental rights analysis,
urging that inequalities with respect to certain vitally important interests (e.g., voting, interstate travel, education) require a compelling
governmental justification, may seek support in the natural law background of the equal protection clause. Where those natural or fundamental rights come from, whether they derive only from the text or
structure of the Constitution, how they are limited, what the role of
courts should be in articulating them: these are all difficult questions
- but questions well within the natural law tradition of the clause.
Similarly, the Jacksonian concept of equal protection, with its emphasis on avoiding discrimination against classes, and the race-specific
radical Republican version of equal protection, with its emphasis on
protecting the civil rights of African-Americans, also find strong support in history; the former, as I have attempted to demonstrate, has
particularly significant implications for the constitutionality of sex discrimination. From this perspective, the debate between those who emphasize immutability of class characteristics and those who emphasize
powerlessness and isolation from the normal political processes is entirely understandable, for both images of equality are reflected in the
mirror of equal protection. They attempt to extrapolate from two historical concepts: the paradigm case of racial discrimination and the
antebellum hostility to special laws and class legislation.
The multiple dimensions of the equal protection clause also give us
some insight into the disarray and chaos in equal protection doctrine
237. H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 248; see also White, Law as Language: Reading Law and
Reading Literature; 60 TEXAS L. REV. 415 (1982).
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between the Slaughter-House Cases in 1873 and the end of the substantive due process era during the New Deal, a disarray that to some
extent is still with us. One should begin with the understanding that
the framers of the fourteenth amendment were not perfect artisans of
legal principles, that they did not consider the many permutations of
their concepts of liberty and equality, and that their principles, as is
true for all mortals, were often in conflict. They were, first and foremost, politicians savoring the fruits of victory (pp. 110-11, 143).
But a theory of equal protection should not be rejected simply because there are hard cases or ambiguities (p. 177). The closed nature
of a classification or its reliance on immutable characteristics, for example, may well undergird some concepts of equal protection, though
few would claim that a profoundly retarded person has a constitutional right to a government job as a nuclear physicist. In general,
laws focusing on named individuals may be impermissible, but occasionally there may be a legitimate class of one. Abstract principles,
particularly when they conflict, cannot eliminate the need for
judgment.
Once we abandon the idea that the framers were perfect, if only the
interpreters were more attentive to their revealed purposes, it follows
that some doctrinal disarray is inevitable. For example, Justice :field
tried to the best of his ability, which was considerable, to distinguish
between privilege and class favoritism, and necessary and reasonable
regulation of economic affairs (pp. 172-74). But even he had trouble,
on many occasions, discerning the difference - particularly with increasing industrialization and state efforts to protect workers. As Professor Kay notes, this Jacksonian distinction tended to collapse and a
boundless search for reasonableness - what pleased the Justices.was substituted in its place. 238 This approach came to be identified
with the now-repudiated era of substantive due process.
Once the era of substantive due process came to an end and equal
protection became the primary framework for analysis, the judicial focus came to be upon motivation as a means of distinguishing between
unconstitutional laws that create privilege or discriminate against
identifiable classes and laws that were permissible, though they might
have side-effects that benefited or harmed particular individuals and
classes. Doctrines of constitutional motivation may be viewed as a
way of reconciling Jacksonian democratic principles with the necessities of the modern, bureaucratized welfare state. If such approaches
appear inadequate, the problem may lie as much with the inadequacy
of the multiple visions embodied in the equal protection clause as with
our own lack of perception as interpreters of the past.
For all the advantages of recognizing the disunity of the concept of
238. Kay, supra note 15, at 722.
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equal protection, there also are sirens that may lead us dangerously
astray. Some constitutionalists may succumb to temptation, believing
that a cornucopia of visions justifies nearly any judicial result, that
there is no such thing as a right or wrong result under the equal protection clause. But scholars and courts should think long and hard
before fashioning an equal protection clause out of such malleable material, retreating to the utter subjectivity of one equal protection clause
for each interpreter. There is much ground, high ground, between an
oversimplified unitary theory of equal protection and the infinite unpredictability and chaos of complete subjectivity. Constitutionalists
should urgently seek that high ground, and we are indebted to Professor Nelson for providing the historical analysis to nurture their efforts.

